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I.  Introduction 
 On January 12, 2010, a catastrophic earthquake struck Haiti, greatly damaging the 
undeveloped country. One estimate reports that this disaster killed more than 230,000 people and 
rendered 1.2 million homeless.
1
 There is no doubt that a natural disaster such as the one that 
occurred in Haiti has a negative impact on the economy in the short run. However, there are 
mixed and inconclusive understandings regarding the effects of natural disasters on the long-run 
economy. One of the first influential studies regarding the relationship between natural disasters 
and long-run economic growth was conducted by Skidmore and Toya in 2002. In their cross 
country study of 89 countries, Skidmore and Toya found a surprising result: countries that were 
subjected to disasters showed faster economic growth. At first glance, this finding hardly seems 
conceivable. Given the damage inflicted on affected areas, how can natural disasters ever be 
positive economic events? To further explore the relationship between disasters and economic 
growth, this paper tests Skidmore and Toya’s finding for the period 1990-2004.This study also 
identifies the channels whereby disaster risks affect economic growth. 
 
II. Definitions  
People have dealt with disasters throughout history and in every part of the globe. A 
disaster can be defined as a situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a 
request to national or international level for external assistance.
2
 Disasters that are caused by 
nature are called natural disasters, examples of which include avalanches, earthquakes, floods, 
forest fires, hurricanes, lightning, tornados, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. Of course, not all 
disasters are caused by nature; some disasters have human origins. Such disasters include wars, 
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 See BBC report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8522732.stm. 
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 This is the official definition of a disaster by EM-DAT: http://www.emdat.be/glossary/9. 
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III. Literature Review 
4
 
The economics of natural disasters is a nascent field. Cavallo and Noy state that 
“compared to the vast amount of research done in natural sciences and other social sciences, 
economic research on natural disasters and their consequences is fairly limited”.
5
 The book The 
Economics of Natural Disasters: Implications for Federal Policy by Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) 
is often regarded as the field’s pioneering work, but there have been few subsequent studies. 
However, recent major catastrophes including the Southeast Asian tsunami and Hurricane 
Katrina heightened interest in this field. 
The body of research in the literature of economics of natural disasters can be categorized 
into two groups. One group considers the short-run effects of disasters on GDP
6
 while the second 
examines the long-run effects of disasters on economic growth. The short-run studies include: 
Albala-Bertrand (1993), Kahn (2005), Anbarci et al. (2005), Bluedorn (2005), Raddatz (2007), 
Strobl (2008), Loayza et al. (2009), Noy (2009), Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. (2009), Leiter et al. 
(2009), Mechler (2009) and Hochrainer (2009); while long-run studies include: Skidmore and 
Toya (2002), Noy and Nualsri (2007), Cuaresma et al. (2008), Jaramillo (2009), Raddatz (2009) 
                                                 
3
 Due to lack of reliable data, human related disasters are excluded from the discussion of this paper. 
4
 The literature review draws heavily on Cavallo and Noy (2009). 
5
 Cavallo and Noy 2009, 6. 
6
 Abbreviations for this paper include: 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
CRED: Center For Research on Epidemiology of Disasters 
TFP: Total Factor Productivity 
GNI: Gross National Income 
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and Hallegatte and Dumas (2009).
7
 Compared to the many short-run studies there have been 
fewer long-run studies conducted in the literature.  
Among the few long-run studies is an article by Skidmore and Toya (2002), which is 
regarded as the first piece of empirical research on the subject.
8
 In their cross-sectional study, 
Skidmore and Toya use the number of natural disasters normalized by land area in each of the 89 
countries included in the sample during the period 1960-1990. They reach a somewhat 
counterintuitive conclusion that disaster risks may promote long-run economic growth. 
Specifically, they find that the frequency of climatic disasters is positively correlated with human 
capital accumulation, growth in total factor productivity (TFP) and per capita GDP growth.
9
  
Interestingly, Noy and Nualsri’s (2007) results supported the opposite conclusion. Using 
a panel of five-year country level data, they find a negative correlation between disaster effects 
and the long-run economic growth rate. The work of Jaramillo (2009) and Raddatz (2009) also 
supports the conclusion reached by Noy and Nualsri (2007). For example, Raddatz, using panel 
time series techniques, finds that “in the long run, a climate related disaster is linked to 
reductions in real GDP per capita by at least 0.6 percent”.
10
 
The Schumpeterian “creative destruction” process is one of the key explanations for the 
conclusions reached by Skidmore and Toya (2002). They explain that “disasters may provide an 
opportunity to update the capital stock, thus encouraging the adoption of new technologies”.
11
 
Cuaresma et al. (2008) and Hallegatte and Dumas (2009) test this creative destruction hypothesis. 
                                                 
7
 This paper focuses on the long-run effects. For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Cavallo and Noy 
(2009).  
8
 For example, Cuaresma et al. (2008) state that “To our knowledge, the article by Skidmore and Toya (2002) is the 
only piece of empirical research that assesses directly the long-run economic impact of natural disasters” (p.1). 
9
 See figures 1 and 2 for some initial evidence regarding the relationship between the number of disasters and 
economic growth.  
10
 Raddatz 2009, 9. 
11
 Skidmore and Toya 2002, 665. 
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The former study utilizes an empirical approach and reaches the conclusion that “creative 
destruction only occurs in developed countries”.
12
 The latter study makes use of a calibrated 
endogenous growth theoretical model and concludes that “disasters do not have positive effects 
on the economy and large disasters can lead to poverty traps”.
13
 
The study by Skidmore and Toya (2002) has inspired several pieces of subsequent 
research, the majority of which find contrary results. This paper serves as a robustness test for 
their study. Specifically, I extend their work to a more recent period, from 1990 to 2004, to see if 
the same relationship between growth and disaster frequencies can be found. Note that compared 
to 1960-1990, the recent period is marked by considerable improvements in the recording of 
minor disasters. In the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), despite the shorter time span, 
the total number of counted natural disasters is twice as large over the period 1990-2007 than 
1960-1990.
14
 Given the absence of agreement regarding the long-run effects of disasters in 
literature, it would be valuable to explore if Skidmore and Toya’s findings hold in the recent 
period characterized by improved data recording.  
 
IV. Disaster Data  
Disaster data for this paper come from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), the 
best available and most widely used database for research on disasters.
15
 This database is 
maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic 
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 Cuaresma, Hlouskova and Obersteiner 2008, 9. 
13
 Hallegatte and Dumas 2009, 783. 
14
 In the database, the total number of natural disasters from 1960 to 1990 is 3,065, whereas the total number of 
natural disasters from 1990 to 2007 is 6,665. Regina Below, a database manager at CRED, explains that this 
increase was mainly due to a better recording of minor disaster events (email to the author). 
15




University of Louvain, Belgium. Since its establishment in 1973, CRED has compiled data on 
global disasters from 1900 to the present.  
CRED uses a standardized method in data compilation and it has not changed its criteria 
for recording a disaster since its establishment. For a disaster to be entered into the CRED 
database, at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled: (1) 10 or more people are 
reported killed; (2) 100 or more people are reported affected/injured/homeless; (3) a state of 
emergency is declared; (4) a call for international assistance is issued.
16
  
EM-DAT reports information on the frequency of disaster events, the number of people 
killed, the number of people affected
17
, and the estimated damage costs in U.S. dollars. However, 
Skidmore and Toya (2002) use only the frequency data in their study. They give three reasons 
for not using the damage and casualties data. First, damage and casualties data are not always 
available and sometimes predictions for missing values are not very accurate (2002, p.670). 
Second, they are more likely to be endogenously determined by the level of income whereas 
disaster frequency is exogenously determined regardless of income level. For example, wealthy 
countries intrinsically face higher economic damage since they have more physical capital at risk 
when faced with a natural disaster. On the other hand, wealthier countries are less likely to entail 
human life loss since they have better medical care and rigorous regulations on building codes, 
engineering, and other safety precautions
 
(2002, p.670). Finally, Skidmore and Toya (2002) 








 By CRED definition, the affected people are those who require immediate assistance during the period of 
emergency. See CRED glossary for more definitions: http://www.emdat.be/glossary/9  
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The number of disaster events is indeed the most exogenous information that can be 
found in the CRED database. Whenever a natural event satisfying one of the four criteria occurs 
in a country, it gets recorded in the database regardless of the income level of the country. 
However, it is questionable whether frequencies alone can reflect actual disaster risks. By the 
CRED criteria, a local storm that killed 10 people is assigned the same frequency value as 
Hurricane Katrina. Table 1 lists the top 5 deadliest natural disasters that occurred in the U.S. 
from 1990 to 2009. It shows that there is a great deal of variation in terms of intensity even 
among the top 5 deadliest disasters. In fact, Hurricane Katrina alone left more casualties than the 
other four combined. Skidmore and Toya acknowledge that frequency alone does not reveal the 
actual disaster risk that countries face and comment that “more accurate data on disaster risk 




V. Theory of Disaster Effects on Long Run Growth 
In the long run, disaster risks can affect the aggregate economy through its factors of 
production. Altered decisions on the factors of production eventually shape the output level and 
thus the standard of living for the economy. In this section, I propose two hypotheses and a 
model that explain how disaster risks can change the level of investment on the factors of 
production. 
First, the effect of disaster risks on the long-run physical capital investment is obscure. 
One might conclude that higher risk of physical capital destruction due to disasters reduces the 
investment on physical capital. This can be true if a country faces a constant risk of a certain 
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 Skidmore and Toya 2002, 682.  
There have been some efforts to come up with reliable data for disaster risks. For example, Yang (2008) uses data 





 However, disasters can also provide an opportunity to update and upgrade the capital 
stock, “allowing the adoption of new technology that is apt for the skilled labor”.
21
  
Second, disaster risks, especially the climatic ones, can lead to increased human capital 
investment. Climatic disasters can be regarded as a proxy for risk to physical capital rather than 
human capital; severe weather conditions are more likely to pose major threats to physical capital 
while forecasting abilities make human capital less vulnerable to climatic disasters. In an 
endogenous growth framework where individuals choose their level of investment between 
physical and human capital, higher climatic disaster risks reduce the expected return to physical 
capital, which in turn increase the relative return to human capital. Skidmore and Toya claim that 




  To offer insights on the effects of a climatic disaster on long-run growth, I utilize the 
Solow model (Solow, 1956) framework employed by Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) and Okuyama 
(2003).  Also, I conceptualize Skidmore and Toya’s conjecture that higher climatic disaster risks 
can lead to more investment in human capital using the Solow model.  




                                           (1) 
                                                 
20
 Jack Hirshleifer shows how continuing recurrences of plague lead to a period of depression in the century 
following the Black Death (1966, p.28). Although plague is substantially different from a climatic disaster in that it 
is a major threat to human capital rather than physical capital, his study shows that continuing recurrences can 
shatter a factor of production.   
21
 Skidmore and Toya 2002, 677. 
22
 Skidmore and Toya 2002, 665. 
23
 This assumption of no technological progress will be relaxed later in this section. 
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where Y denotes the total output, K, the level of capital accumulation, and L, the amount of labor 
input. With the property of constant returns to scale, the production function can be converted 
into the per-capita form: 
    y = f (k)                            (2) 
where y is per-capita output and k is per-capita capital stock. Let s denote the saving rate, δ, the 
depreciation rate, and n, the population growth rate. Then the steady state level of capital stock 
k* satisfies the following condition: 
   ∆k = s ⋅ f ( k ) − ( n + δ )⋅ k  = 0 .                                               (3) 
Arranging terms,  
                                                  s ⋅ f ( k* ) = ( n + δ )⋅ k*.            (4) 
This steady state situation is described at point A of Figure 3. Now suppose that a climatic 
disaster occurs and damages physical capital but leaves the human population unharmed. The 
amount of per-capita capital stock decreases from k* to kd, and the economy’s output per-capita 
decreases from the steady state level y* to yd.  
 In the aftermath of the disaster, the economy is assumed to go through a recovery period. 
In the recovery period, resources are allocated toward the reconstruction of the damaged capital 
stock. Moreover, there might also be international aid that can further stimulate physical capital 
accumulation. Hence the economy experiences a short period of higher saving sr , which in turn 
accelerates  the speed of recovery. As the economy recovers from the damage, the saving rate 
goes back to the original saving rate, s. The economy returns back to the steady state per-capita 
capital stock, k*, ( movement from D to A) and the steady state per-capita output level, y*. 
 The same point can be made using the growth rate of per capita capital stock. Dividing 
both sides of the equation (3), the growth rate of k, γk  , can be written as : 
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γk   =    
  ∆ 
 
     =     
    ⋅        
 
 −             .                              (5) 
In the steady state, there is no change in γk  , so the economy is initially at point A of Figure 4 
where 
                                                     
    ⋅        
 
     =                .             (6) 
With the climatic disaster, the level of capital stock decreases to kd and output falls because of 
the shock caused by the disaster. Now, as the economy goes through the recovery period, the 
saving rate increases due to the massive reconstruction effort and foreign aid, accelerating the 
speed of recovery. As the reconstruction progresses, the saving rate eventually returns to the 
previous level and the capital growth rate returns back to the steady state level of zero. 
(movement from D to A) 
 Now I relax the assumption of no technological progress. Suppose an economy with 
initial technology level A(t) has a constant technology growth rate of x. This economy now 
experiences the same climatic disaster described above. As Skidmore and Toya (2002) point out, 
there might be a “creative destruction” effect on the reconstruction process - old capital stock 
that needed replacement before the disaster is updated with newer technologies. Therefore, 
during the recovery period, the technology growth rate increases temporarily from x to xr as 
shown in Figure 5. The technology growth rate eventually returns to its original level once the 
recovery is complete since the replacement itself cannot induce technological progress. Using a 
labor augmenting technological progress model (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) Equation (1) 
becomes: 




where L⋅A(t ) denotes the amount of effective labor (defined to be L̂ ), a measure that reflects 
productivity of each worker. The capital per effective worker, k̂ , can be written as:  
                          k̂  =  
 
 ⋅     
  =  
    
    ,    (8) 




 = f ( k̂ )   .      (9) 
The change in per-capita capital stock becomes: 
                                           ∆k  =  s ⋅ f [ k, A(t )] − ( n +δ )⋅k  ,                               (10) 
which can be further reduced to: 
                                      ∆ k̂ = s ⋅ f ( k̂ ) − ( x + n + δ )⋅ k̂   .       (11) 
Dividing both sides of (11) by k̂ , growth rate of capital per effective worker is:  
γ k̂  = 
  ⋅    k̂  
k̂
 − ( x + n + δ )  .       (12) 
Since there is no change in capital per effective worker at the steady state, the following 
condition should apply (point A of Figure 6):  
           
  ⋅    k̂  
k̂
 = ( x + n + δ )  .                               (13) 
When a disaster occurs, the capital stock per effective worker decreases from the steady state 
level to k̂ d . At this point, the growth rate of capital per effective worker is B-C. As was the case 
with the economy which featured no technological progress, the reconstruction effort coupled 
with foreign aid raises the saving rate from s to sr , contributing to the increase in the growth rate 
11 
 
of capital per effective worker. However, as shown in Figure 5, the economy whose capital stock 
is upgraded during the recovery period also experiences a higher rate of technological growth, xr. 
With the “creative destruction” process in effect, the growth rate of capital per effective worker 
is now D-E, which is lower than the capital growth rate with no technological replacement, D-C 
(Figure 6). To further justify this effect, Okuyama (2003) explains that “a higher rate of 
technological progress leads to a faster growth of the effective labor”.
24
 Compared to the period 
of the regular technological growth rate, x, more resources are spent on making each worker 
more productive in the period of the higher technological growth rate, xr. That is, during the 
reconstruction process, the technology-replacing economy directs more resources towards human 
capital rather than physical capital than the economy with no technology replacement. This 
model suggests that climatic disasters can induce human capital investment for an economy that 
experiences creative destruction during the recovery period. 
    
VI. Methodology  
 To test the proposed theory and examine the relationship between natural disasters and 
growth rate, I use the frequency data from EM-DAT and apply the method employed by 
Skidmore and Toya in 2002 for the period 1990 to 2004. One important strategy they use is the 
categorization of natural disasters into two groups; the climatic disaster group and the geologic 
disaster group. I adopt their categorization but I employ slightly different definitions of the two 
categories in order to be more consistent with the definitions used by CRED. Specifically, I 
define climatic events to be the events caused by atmospheric processes (meteorological) plus 
the events caused by deviations in the normal water cycle (hydrological). By the CRED 
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 Okuyama 2003, 19. 
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classification, the climatic disaster group consists of storms, including thunderstorms, blizzards, 
sandstorms, generic storms, tornados, and orographic storms among others, and also includes 
flood and wet mass movement. Also, I define the geologic disaster events to be the events 
originating from solid earth.  Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, rock falls, avalanches, landslides, 
subsidences and other dry mass movements fall into this category.
25
 
The rationale behind this separation is that climatic and geologic risks may influence 
factors of production differently and may thus have different effects on the long-run economy. 
Compared to geologic disasters, climatic disasters are more frequent, often occurring in a 
particular period of time during a year. Climatic disasters are also more predictable, hence it is 
possible for people to evacuate the affected region beforehand. On the other hand, geologic 
disasters are less frequent and more irregular in their occurrence. They are also less predictable, 
which impedes the population’s ability to evacuate. Therefore, as Skidmore and Toya claim, 
“climatic disasters are a reasonable proxy for risk to physical capital while geologic disasters 




VII. Results and Analysis 
A) Disasters and economic growth  
Table 2 reports the results from a simple semi-logarithmic regression. The dependent 
variable is per capita GDP growth rate and the explanatory variables include the number of per 
land disasters. The relevant time period for columns (1) and (2) is 1960-1990 and the time period 
                                                 
25
 In my data for example, if Haiti had exactly 4 storms and 1 earthquake in 1980, I add 4 to its climatic disasters 
variable and 1 to its geologic disasters variable for that year. For specific classification of each disaster type, see 
http://www.emdat.be/classification. 
26
 Skidmore and Toya 2002, 671-672. 
 For more information about the variables, see Appendix tables A and B. 
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for columns (3) and (4) is 1990-2004.
27
 Consistent with Skidmore and Toya (2002), I find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the growth rate and the number of total 
(climatic + geologic) disasters normalized by land area for the period 1960-1990. I also find a 
similar relationship between the growth rate and disaster frequencies in the recent period, 1990-
2004, though the relationship is not as significant as was the case in the previous period.
28
  
In the first period (1960-1990), there is a stronger correlation between per capita GDP 
growth and the number of per land climatic disasters (heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic=2.97) 
but there is no statistically significant relationship between the growth rate and the number of per 
land geologic disasters (t= -0.63). However, in the second period (1990-2004), the relationship 
between climatic disasters and the growth rate gets weaker (t=1.65) compared to the relationship 
between total disasters and the growth rate (t=2.17).  
Clearly, there seems to be less of a distinction between the climatic disasters and geologic 
disasters in terms of their relevance to the growth rate in the recent period. One possible 
explanation for this is the potential difference in disaster recording over time; as discussed 
previously, the CRED database has only recently started to record minor disasters. The minor 
disasters, which were not counted in the earlier period, may make each disaster group less 
distinct from each other and serve to mitigate the relationship between disaster risk and 
economic growth for the later period. Another reason presented by Skidmore in a personal 
communication to the author on April 2, 2010 is the difference in forecasting ability and 
communication level in the two periods. He suggests that there was an important interaction 
                                                 
27
 Columns (1) and (2) is a replication of Skidmore and Toya (2002, p.671). The slight differences in t statistics 
come from a different disaggregation of climatic and geologic disasters. See p.671 for their definition of the two 
disaster groups. 
28
 This positive relationship between the growth rate and disaster frequencies can be also found in figures 1 and 2. 
Note the slope of the fitted values is flatter in the recent period.  
14 
 
between disaster propensity and improvements in communication in the earlier period, 1960-
1990. During this period, improving accuracy in weather forecasting became increasingly 
beneficial for people in the disaster-prone area. In the short run, they could evacuate from the 
afflicted region, and in the long run, they could make better long-term investments. After the 
90’s; however, the communication revolution had already run its course, so the benefit from 
improving communication also decreased and one no longer observes any relationship between 
climatic disasters and investment decisions. 
Table 3 reports the results from a growth regression that includes some of the control 
variables that are typically considered to be key determinants of economic growth for the period 
1960-1990.
29
  Skidmore and Toya (2002) use the following multiple linear regression (MLR) 
model:  
                      i   ε                                                                (14) 
where      represents the average growth rate of real GDP per capita during the period t,     , the 
average ratio of investment to GDP in period t ,    , the level of openness during the period t,   , 
the average annual growth rate of physical capital stock per capita in t, and   i , the log of initial 
income in the initial year i for the period t. 
30
 
As explained by many growth theoretical models, an economy that allocates a greater 
proportion of its output to investment grows faster, so     is expected to be positively correlated 
with the growth rate. A country with greater degree of openness is more likely to adopt new 
technology and improve institutions that are critical for economic development, hence the 
                                                 
29
  This is a replication of the regression done by Skidmore and Toya (2002, p.673) included here for comparison.   
30
 Log in this paper means the natural logarithmic function (log of base e). I take a natural log of a variable in order 
to stabilize the variance of a sample, linearize the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variables, and to normalize positively skewed distributions of the variables (Bland, 2000). Also, for the disaster 
variables, I add one to the frequency before I take a natural log in order to avoid arithmetic error. 
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coefficient for     is expected to be positive. Also, since capital stock is essentially one of the 
factors of production, countries with faster growing capital stock are assumed to experience a 
faster growing output level. However, the coefficient for the initial income level depends greatly 
on the period of consideration and the number of observations. For the particular period 1960-
1990, the world by and large observed a rapid increase in GDP compared to other periods.
31
 The 
countries that initially started with low income levels are more likely to show higher growth rates, 
making it plausible to expect a negative coefficient for the initial income variable.  
 Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics (in 
brackets) from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Column (1) of the table shows that all 
the estimates for the explanatory variables are statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Consistent with Skidmore and Toya (2002), after accounting for the investment ratio to GDP, 
openness, growth in capital stock and initial income, I find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the number of total disasters normalized by land area and per capita GDP 
growth (Column 2).
32
  As Column (3) shows, the positive relationship is even stronger for the 
number of climatic disasters (t=2.43). However, I find no statistical significance with which to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the number of geologic disasters 
and per capita GDP growth for this period (t= -0.34). In all cases the semi-logarithmic regression 
equations fit the data moderately well, explaining more than 70% of the variation in per capita 
GDP growth rate.  
                                                 
31
 For example, in my sample of 88 countries, the mean GDP growth rate is 0.02 (2%) for the period 1960-1990, 
while the mean GDP growth rate is 0.0167 (1.67%) for the period 1990-2004. See Appendix table B for the 
summary statistics.  
32
 Similar relationships can be found even without the normalization by land area. (Skidmore and Toya, 2002) But it 




 Table 4 lists the results of a similar regression for the recent period, 1990-2004. I use 
major components of GDP, such as consumption, investment and government spending as the 
explanatory variables.
33
 While one would expect to find positive coefficients for other 
components of GDP, the robust positive relationship between government spending and growth 
is noteworthy.
34
 I also add the disaster variables that are not normalized by land area to explore 
the effects of normalization.  
 Controlling for investment, government spending, consumption and gross domestic 
savings, I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the number of per land 
total disasters and per capita GDP growth in the period 1990 to 2004. The relationship is not very 
significant unless I normalize the number of total disasters by land area (t=1.34). For the 
geologic disasters, I find no significant relationship whether I use the total number or the number 
normalized by land area. For the climatic disasters, I find a positive and significant relationship 
between the number of climatic disasters and per capita GDP growth rate regardless of the 
normalization.  
 In summary, Skidmore and Toya’s findings (2002) continue to hold for the recent period 
of enhanced disaster recording. The regression analysis suggests a robust positive correlation 
between the frequency of disasters and long-run economic growth in both periods of 
consideration. The major difference between the two periods is that the number of per land 
climatic disasters reveals a weaker correlation than the number of per land total disasters in the 
later period. 
 
                                                 
33
 The gross domestic savings variable is also added to increase the explanatory power. The correlation between this 
variable and the investment ratio variable is 0.5490. 
34
 Skidmore and Toya (2002) find a robust negative relationship between government consumption and growth rate 
for the period 1960-1990 (p.673). 
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B) Disasters and physical capital investment 
In an attempt to identify the channels through which disasters affect economic growth, I 
first investigate the relationship between measures of physical capital and the number of 
disasters. The measures of physical capital include investment ratio to GDP, growth in capital 
stock, and the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show the 
relationship between investment ratio to GDP and the disaster variables from a simple semi-
logarithmic regression. Consistent with Skidmore and Toya (2002, p.679), for the period 1960-
1990, no significant relationship is found between investment and disasters. This is also the case 
after controlling for initial income and the level of secondary schooling (Columns 3 and 4). 
 Table 6 lists similar regression results for the earlier period using growth in capital stock 
as the dependent variable. With a simple regression, I find a significant relationship at the ten 
percent level (t=1.72) between climatic disasters and growth in capital stock (Column 2). 
However, after including additional explanatory variables and regional dummies, this 
relationship disappears (Column 4).   
The same results are found for the recent period, 1990-2004. In Table 7, I find no 
significant relationship between the investment to GDP ratio and disasters of any kind. In Table 
8, I use the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP as my dependent variable but still find no 
relationship, regardless of the inclusion of control variables. The physical capital regressions 
show that disaster coefficients are generally negative. However, statistically insignificant 
coefficients suggest that physical capital is not a good candidate for the route whereby disasters 
affect economic growth. 
C) Disasters and human capital investment  
18 
 
 The conjecture proposed by Skidmore and Toya (2002) together with the theoretical 
model presented in this paper suggest that climatic disaster risk can promote human capital 
investment. Provided that a society can choose its level of investment in the factors of production, 
more climatic risk to physical capital makes human capital relatively attractive, which in turn 
induces the society to invest more in human capital than physical capital (Skidmore and Toya, 
2002). Human capital accumulation, which by nature enjoys the benefit of knowledge spillover, 
fosters economic growth as emphasized by many endogenous theoretical models (Lucas, 1988). 
This section explores the relationship between human capital investment and disaster risks 
empirically.  
 As in other studies, since human capital can be ambiguous in definition, I employ some 
proxies for human capital investment such as educational expenditure, secondary and tertiary 
school enrollment ratio, and the annual growth rate of secondary schooling year. I start with a 
replication of Skidmore and Toya’s study (2002, p.680). Table 9 reports the regression results of 
the first independent variable, the average annual growth rate of secondary schooling year for the 
period 1960-1990. After accounting for initial income, initial years of secondary schooling, 
fertility rate and the investment rate, I find a robust positive relationship between growth in 
secondary schooling years and per land climatic disasters (Column 4). This result is consistent 
with that of Skidmore and Toya’s (2002, p.680), except that the negative relationship between 
geologic disasters and the dependent variable disappears after incorporating additional 
explanatory variables such as fertility rate (1960-1985, average) and investment ratio. 
 Table 10 shows the results of the same regression except that this time, the dependent 
variable is the average gross secondary school enrollment ratio for the period 1960-1985. Again, 
the positive relationship between climatic disasters and the dependent variable is weaker (10% 
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significance level) than that of Skidmore and Toya’s (2002 p.680) after the inclusion of the other 
explanatory variables. The secondary school enrollment ratio also shows a similar positive 
correlation with the climatic disasters for the recent period, 1990-2004 (Column 4, Table 11). 
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 12, I present regression estimates of the tertiary school 
enrollment ratio that include the explanatory variables discussed previously.
35
 After accounting 
for initial income, investment ratio and regional dummies, I find no significant relationship 
between the tertiary school enrollment ratio and the frequency of climatic disasters. However, I 
find a negative and statistically significant relationship between tertiary school enrollment and 
the geologic disasters (Column 2). One possible explanation may be that the geologic disasters 
induced emigration of educated people to countries that were not included in this sample. 
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 12, I list the results of a similar regression with average 
educational expenditure (% of GNI, 1990-2007) as the dependent variable. Similar to my results 
from the previous regression, I only find a negative relationship between geologic disasters and 
educational expenditure (t=-2.59). Compared to the enrollment ratio variables, educational 
expenditure reflects the direct interest of a society in its human capital investment. One 
explanation for the negative relationship may be that the geologic disasters in this period posed a 
threat that was serious enough to lower the expected return to human capital investment.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 The empirical evidence found in this paper suggests that there is a positive correlation 
between long-run economic growth and the frequency of the disasters. The positive correlation is 
consistent in both periods of consideration: the period studied by Skidmore and Toya, 1960-1990 
                                                 
35
 Since data are not readily available, I use tertiary school enrollment ratio of 1999 to maximize the number of 
observations for the sample. This can be viewed as a crude measure of the average ratio from 1990 to 2004.  
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and the recent period, 1990-2004. This study also explored the channels whereby disasters affect 
economic growth, both theoretically and empirically. For the period 1960-1990, Skidmore and 
Toya (2002) find that “human capital accumulation and technological development spurred by 
climatic disasters are the main routes through which disasters affect economic growth. The 
empirical study for the recent period shows weaker evidence for climatic disasters inducing 
human capital accumulation, but stronger evidence for geologic disasters leading to human 
capital destruction.  
 One should keep in mind that the empirical analysis in this paper was conducted by using 
disaster frequency data in isolation. As discussed previously, the frequency data are indeed the 
most exogenous information that can be found in the EM-DAT database. However, there surely 
is a price for excluding casualties and damage costs data in the analysis; disaster frequency alone 
may fail to fully represent the level of actual disaster risk.
36
 Further study on this subject should 
explore measures that are not predetermined by the income level but are at the same time 
reasonably representative of the actual disaster risk. The absence of such a measure may be one 
important source of the disagreement in the current long-run studies. Nevertheless, the evidence 
found in this study suggests that risks associated with natural disasters provide substantial 
implications regarding a society’s investment decisions on its factors of production. 
  
                                                 
36
 Using a more endogenous measure that takes into account the casualties and damage data can lead to a very 
different conclusion than using the frequency data alone. One such measure is the Climate Risk Index (CRI). For 




<Figures and Tables> 
 
 
         Figure 1. Relationship between the number of disasters and GDP growth rate: 1960-1990. 




         Figure 2.  Relationship between the number of disasters and GDP growth rate: 1990-2004. 






   Figure 3. Solow Model with a Disaster. 
   Source: Okuyama (2003, p.15) 
 
   Figure 4: Dynamics of Recovery. 




Figure 5. Technological Progress and a Disaster. 
              
     Figure 6. Transitional Dynamics with Technological Progress. 
       Source: Okuyama (2003, p. 17, 19).  
       Note: Some changes in notation were made by the author for Figure 6.  
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Table 1. Top 5 Deadliest Natural Disasters: USA 1990-2009 
 
 
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 







Rank Dates Disaster Numbers 
 





1 Aug 2005 Storm Tropical cyclone  Katrina 1833 11,000,148 10000 





670 5,000,000 11000 
3 Mar 1993 Storm 
  
270 3,000,010 7000 





257 2,100,000 7000 





214 640,064 2500 
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Table 2. Regression table with dependent variables GDP Growth Rates 
 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. The regressions are done with SUR 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) method. Columns (1) and (3) show the results of one set of SUR, columns (2) 
and (4) present the results of the other set. 
The robust z statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables 
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 
              (1960-1990) 
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 
(1990-2004) 
      
Per Land Total  
Disasters (1960-1990) 
0.00230*** 
[2.61]   





   





   
Per Land Total  
Disasters (1990-2004) 
      0.00235** 
    [2.17] 
 
   
Per Land Climatic  
Disasters (1990-2004) 
   0.00186* 
[1.65] 
   
Per Land Geologic  
Disasters (1990-2004) 
   0.00118 
[1.27] 






    0.00451 
    [0.76] 
0.00495 
[0.86] 
Observations 88 88     88 88 
R-squared 0.08 0.11     0.04 0.06 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Regression table with the dependent variable GDP Growth Rate: 1960-1990 
 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model.  
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
This regression is a replication of Skidmore and Toya (2002, p.673). 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1960-1990) 
    





































Per Land Climatic Disasters 
(1960-1990) 
  0.00153** 
[2.43] 
  
Per Land Geologic Disasters 
(1960-1990) 










Observations 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.73 0.76 0.76 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1990-2004) 
 Investment / GDP 
(1990-2004) 
0.00110*** 0.00102*** 0.00105*** 0.00108*** 0.00108*** [4.44] [4.13] [4.22] [4.38] [4.38] 
 





















       Government Spending  
/GDP (1990-2004) 
0.00111*** 0.00118*** 0.00119*** 0.00113*** 0.00115*** 
[3.64] [3.79] [3.80] [3.68] [3.73] 
 Consumption /GDP 




0.000814*** 0.000827*** 0.000909*** 0.000930*** 
[3.43] [3.50] [3.84] [3.83] 
       Gross Domestic Savings 
/GDP(1990-2007) 
0.00133*** 0.00132*** 0.00132*** 0.00133*** 0.00137*** 
[4.70] [4.96] [4.92] [4.67] [4.59] 




   
 
[2.49] 
   
















      Total Disasters 
(1990-2004) 
   
0.0000192 
 
   
[1.34] 
 
      Climatic Disasters 
(1990-2004) 
    
0.0000354** 
    
[2.58] 
      Geologic Disasters 
(1990-2004) 
    
-0.00013 
    
[-1.32] 
      Constant -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.112*** 
 
[-4.19] [-4.53] [-4.55] [-4.21] [-4.22] 
      Observations 88 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.4 0.44 0.45 0.4 0.41 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
 The gross domestic savings ratio to GDP variable is relevant for the period 1990 to 2007.  
All the other variables including the CRED disaster variables are relevant for the period 1990 to 2004. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
29 
 
Table 5. Regression table with dependent variable Investment/ GDP :1960-1990 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Investment/ GDP (1960-1990) 






Log of Secondary schooling (1960) 




































Observations 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0 0.01 0.44 0.44 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                      
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  












Table 6. Regression table with dependent variable Growth in Capital Stock :1960-1985 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Dependent variable : Growth in Capital Stock (1960-1985) 
Log of Initial Income (1960) 





Log of Secondary schooling (1960) 























NIEs and ASEAN 










































Observations 88 88 82 82 
R-squared 0.02 0.05 0.42 0.42 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
This regression is a replication of Skidmore and Toya (2002, p.679). 
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Table 7. Regression table with dependent variable Investment/ GDP: 1990-2004 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Investment/ GDP (1990-2004) 
     
Log of Initial Income (1990) 





Log of Secondary school  
enrollment (1990) 




































Observations 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0 0 0.53 0.53 
 *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 






                      
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  















(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable : Gross Capital Formation / GDP (1990-2004) 
     
Log of Initial Income (1990) 





Log of Secondary school  
enrollment (1990) 























NIEs and ASEAN 










































Observations 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.28 0.28 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  




Table 9. Regression table with dependent variable Growth in Secondary Schooling   
Year :1960-1990 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Growth in Secondary Schooling Year (1960-1990) 
     
Log of Initial Income (1960) 























































Observations 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.78 0.79 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  










        (1)            (2)               (3)                      (4) 
Dependent Variable :  Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (1960-1985) 
Log of Initial Income (1960) 





























































Observations 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.84 0.84 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  




Table 11. Regression table with dependent variable Secondary School Enrollment Ratio: 1990-2004 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets. 
*** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
** indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the five percent level.  
* indicates that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (1990-2004) 
Log of Initial Income (1990) 





Investment / GDP 
(1990-2004) 

















NIEs and ASEAN 










































Observations 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.81 0.82 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





Table 12. Regression table with dependent variables Tertiary School Enrollment Ratio 
(1999) and Educational Expenditure (1990-2007) 
 
      (1)  (2)              (3)           (4) 
Dependent Variables 






































































[-0.14]   

















Observations 81 81 87 87 
R-squared 0.79 0.8 0.29 0.34 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from a semi logarithmic regression model. 
Robust t statistics are reported in brackets.  
For countries for which no tertiary school enrollment data are found for 1999, data for the next available year are 
used (mostly 2002). Countries that are excluded for the first two regressions (columns 1 and 2) are Ecuador, 
Germany, Haiti, Kenya, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Syrian Arab Republic. The country with no educational 
expenditure data is Papua New Guinea. 
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Appendix Table A. Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Variables Definition Source 
   Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1960-1990) Average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP for 
the period 1960-1990. 
SH1 
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1990-2004) Average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(Constant Prices) for the period 1990-2004. 
SH2 
Log of Initial Income (1960) Logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1960. SH1 
Log of Initial Income (1990) Logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1990. WMP 
Government Spending /GDP (1990-2004) Average Government Share of CGDP (% of GDP) for 
the period 1990-2004. 
SH2 
Consumption / GDP (1990-2004)  Average Consumption Share of CGDP (% of GDP) 
for the period 1990-2004. 
SH2 
Gross Domestic Savings / GDP (1990-2007) Average Growth Domestic Savings (% of GDP) 
(1990-2007) 
WDI2 
Fertility (1960-1985) Average net fertility rate for the period 1960-1985. BL1 
Openness (1965-1990) 
The fraction of years during the period 1965-90 in 
which the country is rated as an open economy 
according to the criteria in Sachs and Warner (1995). 
SW 
Openness (1990-2004) 
Logarithm of average openness in current prices for 
the period 1990-2004 where openness is defined to be 
exports plus imports divided by real GDP.  
SH2 
   
   Total Disasters (1990-2004) Logarithm of 1+ number of total disaster events 
(climatic plus geologic) for the period 1990-2004. 
CRED 
Climatic Disasters (1990-2004) Logarithm of 1+ number of climatic disaster events for 
the period 1990-2004. 
CRED 
Geologic Disasters (1990-2004)  Logarithm of 1+ number of geologic disaster events 
for the period 1990-2004. 
CRED 
Per Land Total Disasters (1960-1990) Logarithm of 1+ number of total disaster events per 
million square miles for the period 1960-1990. 
CRED 
Per Land Climatic Disasters (1960-1990) Logarithm of 1+ number of climatic disaster events 
per million square miles for the period 1960-1990. 
CRED 
Per Land Geologic Disasters (1960-1990) Logarithm of 1+ number of geologic disaster events 
per million square miles for the period 1960-1990. 
CRED 
Per Land Total Disasters (1990-2004) Logarithm of 1+ number of total disaster events per 
million square miles for the period 1990-2004. 
CRED 
Per Land Climatic Disasters (1990-2004) Logarithm of 1+ number of climatic disaster events 
per million square miles for the period 1990-2004. 
CRED 
Per Land Geologic Disasters (1990-2004) Logarithm of 1+ number of geologic disaster events 
per million square miles for the period 1990-2004. 
CRED 
      
Investment / GDP (1960-1990) 
Average ratio of real domestic investment to real GDP 
for the period 1960-1990. 
BL1 
Investment/ GDP (1990-2004) 
Average Investment Share of CGDP (% of GDP) for 
the period 1990-2004. 
SH2 
Growth in Capital Stock (1960-1985) 
Average annual growth rate of physical capital stock 
per capita constructed by Kind and Levine (1994) for 
the period 1960-1985. 
KL 
Gross Capital Formation / GDP (1990-2004) 
Average Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) for the 
period 1990-2004. 
 WDI2 
   
 
  Continued 
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Variables Definition Source 
   
Growth in Secondary Schooling Year (1960-1990) 
Average annual growth rate of secondary schooling 
year for the period 1960-1990. 
BL2 
Log of Secondary schooling (1960) 
Logarithm of secondary schooling years in the total 
population aged 15 and over in 1960. 
BL2 
Log of Secondary school enrollment (1990) 
Logarithm of gross secondary school enrollment ratio 
in 1990. 
WDI2 
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (1960-1985) 
Average gross secondary school enrollment ratio for 
the period 1960-1985. 
WDI1 
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (1990-2004) 
Average gross secondary school enrollment ratio for 
the period 1990-2004.  
WDI2 
Tertiary School Enrollment Ratio (1999) Gross tertiary school enrollment ratio in 1999.  WDI2 
Educational Expenditure (1990-2007) Educational expenditure (% of GNI) for the period 
1990-2007. 
WDI2 
   
   Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries. ST 
Latin America Dummy for Latin-American countries. ST 
NIEs and ASEAN Dummy for NIEs and ASEAN member countries. ST 
OECD Dummy for OECD member countries.  ST 
   
   
Sources:  
BL1: Barro and Lee (1994). 
BL2: Barro and Lee (1996). 
CRED: EM-DAT. (2009). 
KL: King and Levine (1994). 
SH1: Summers and Heston (1994). 
SH2: Summers and Heston (2006). 
ST: Skidmore and Toya (2002). 
SW: Sachs and Warner (1997). 
WDI1: World Development Indicators (1998). 
WDI2: World Development Indicators (2009). 
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 Available at http://www.worldmapper.org/display.php?selected=163. 
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Appendix Table B. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1960-1990) 88 0.0200814 0.017229 -0.013893 0.066633 
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1990-2004) 88 0.0167112 0.0183582 -0.041503 0.07 
Log of Initial Income (1960) 88 7.518449 0.863173 5.7462 9.19979 
Log of Initial Income (1990) 88 8.333317 1.087383 6.324359 10.05195 
Government Spending /GDP (1990-2004) 88 19.9873 7.614395 5.413169 47.7575 
Consumption / GDP (1990-2004)  88 67.34843 13.30569 38.84288 110.3162 
Gross Domestic Savings / GDP (1990-2007) 88 18.18114 11.78566 -27.556 47.389 
Fertility (1960-1985) 88 4.35379 1.515995 1.85302 7.20038 
Openness (1965-1990) 82 0.4165665 0.4482854 0 1 
Openness (1990-2004) 88 4.160218 0.5738483 2.773231 5.866682 
      Total Disasters (1990-2004) 88 29.48864 44.71879 0 330 
Climatic Disasters (1990-2004) 88 25.38636 40.82664 0 317 
Geologic Disasters (1990-2004)  88 4.102273 8.292137 0 55 
Per Land Total Disasters (1960-1990) 88 4.871978 1.991405 0 11.96559 
Per Land Climatic Disasters (1960-1990) 88 4.615195 2.113321 0 11.96559 
Per Land Geologic Disasters (1960-1990) 88 1.668894 2.041804 0 6.12503 
Per Land Total Disasters (1990-2004) 88 5.198774 1.762258 0 10.63993 
Per Land Climatic Disasters (1990-2004) 88 5.066141 1.758786 0 10.63993 
Per Land Geologic Disasters (1990-2004) 88 1.974229 2.090313 0 6.918795 
      
Investment / GDP (1960-1990) 88 0.1938256 0.0813297 0.019997 0.37825 
Investment/ GDP (1990-2004) 88 16.13562 8.024189 2.9409 37.74832 
Growth in Capital Stock (1960-1985) 88 0.6542348 0.5543822 -0.71858 2.32263 
Gross Capital Formation / GDP (1990-2004) 88 21.61807 6.500118 7 54.07 
      
Growth in Secondary Schooling Year (1960-1990) 88 0.0410966 0.0313567 -0.022233 0.22163 
Log of Secondary schooling (1960) 88 -0.9623909 1.380523 -6.90776 1.50452 
Log of Secondary school enrollment (1990) 88 -0.7382054 0.715637 -2.813411 0.1739533 
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (1960-1985) 88 0.3944913 0.2521885 0.025833 0.91 
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (1990-2004) 88 0.6852423 0.3295576 0.071111 1.394 
Tertiary School Enrollment Ratio (1999) 81 0.2648839 0.2207905 0.0029 0.8242 
Educational Expenditure (1990-2007) 87 4.202805 1.645327 0.944 7.722 
      Sub-Saharan Africa 88 0.2272727 0.4214718 0 1 
Latin America 88 0.2613636 0.4418956 0 1 
NIEs and ASEAN 88 0.0681818 0.2535021 0 1 
OECD 88 0.2613636 0.4418956 0 1 
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Appendix Table C. List of Countries 
  
Algeria DZA Kenya KEN 
Argentina ARG Korea, Rep. KOR 
Australia AUS Lesotho LSO 
Austria AUT Liberia LBR 
Bangladesh BGD Malawi MWI 
Barbados BRB Malaysia MYS 
Belgium BEL Mali MLI 
Bolivia BOL Mauritius MUS 
Botswana BWA Mexico MEX 
Brazil BRA Mozambique MOZ 
Cameroon CMR Nepal NPL 
Canada CAN Netherlands NLD 
Central African Republic CAF New Zealand NZL 
Chile CHL Nicaragua NIC 
Colombia COL Niger NER 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR Norway NOR 
Costa Rica CRI Pakistan PAK 
Cyprus CYP Panama PAN 
Denmark DNK Papua New Guinea PNG 
Dominican Republic DOM Paraguay PRY 
Ecuador ECU Peru PER 
El Salvador SLV Philippines PHL 
Fiji FJI Portugal PRT 
Finland FIN Senegal SEN 
France FRA Singapore SGP 
Germany DEU South Africa ZAF 
Ghana GHA Spain ESP 
Greece GRC Sri Lanka LKA 
Guatemala GTM Swaziland SWZ 
Guyana GUY Sweden SWE 
Haiti HTI Switzerland CHE 
Honduras HND Syrian Arab Republic SYR 
Hong Kong, China HKG Thailand THA 
Iceland ISL Togo TGO 
India IND Trinidad and Tobago TTO 
Indonesia IDN Tunisia TUN 
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN Turkey TUR 
Iraq IRQ Uganda UGA 
Ireland IRL United Kingdom GBR 
Israel ISR United States USA 
Italy ITA Uruguay URY 
Jamaica JAM Venezuela VEN 
Japan JPN Zambia ZMB 





<Figure 7 (a): World map of hazard hotspots and countries most affected from 1998-2007 according to CRI> 
The underlying map is taken from CARE 2008 
Note: on the map, blue areas with striped overlay represent risk hotspots with predicted significant increase in 
population density. The darker the underlying color, the higher is the expected increase in population density. 
 
Source: Harmeling (2008, p.8) 
 
 
<Figure 7 (b): World map of Climatic Risk Index Ranking 1990-2008> 
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